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REASONABLE SEARCHES
PAUL C. MATTHEWS*
One of the most cherished and jealously guarded rights
of mankind is the right to privacy - the right to be let
alone. Constitutional recognition of that right is found in
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution'
and in Section Eighteen of the Constitution of North Dakota.2
Both of these constitutional provisions prohibit unreasonable
searches and limit search by warrant to those warrants
issued upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
which describe with particularity, the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
A search is a violation of the right to privacy. It in-
volves either an exploration, an invasion, a quest, a prying
into hidden places or a searching out.3  More than the
ordinary use of the senses is required for a search, with
the result, in most cases, of a trespass either to the person
or to property.4  It can not be said that there has been a
search when the items are in plain view of the officer.5
SEARCH WARRANTS
A search is reasonable when it is made pursuant to a
*A.B., University of Missouri; J.D., University of Chicago; Professor
of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violat-
ed, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly discribing the place to be searched.
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Constitution Amendment IV.
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall be issued but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons and things to be seized." North Dakota Consti-
tution Article 1 § 18.
3. In People v. Bouchard, 326 P.2d 646 (1958) where the court held
that there was no search and seizure when a pair of btass knuckles were
disclosed as the result of the officer's looking under the mattress on a
bed, the court cited the case of People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 219,
300 P.2d, 729, 733, and approved the following language from the opinion
in that case with respect to the definition of a "search": ". : . the term
implies some exploratory investigation or an invasion and quest, a look-
ing for or seeking out. . . . a search implies a prying into hidden places
for that which is concealed and that the object searched for has been
hidden or intentionally put out of the way. . . . it is generally held that
a mere looking at that which is open to view is not a 'search'." See also
State v. Hawkins, 240 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Mo. 1951), McDonald v. U.S. 335
U.S. 451, 69 Sup. Ct. 191 (1948).
4. McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451, 69 Sup. Ct. 191 (1948).
5. It was said by the Court in People v. Brooks, 316 P.2d 435 (Cal.
1957) that seeing cases of whiskey on the back seat of a car by looking
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valid search warrant. 5 I Such a warrant is defined by the
North Dakota Code 6 as being an order in writing, made
in the name of the State of North Dakota signed by a
magistrate, and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property and bring it to the
magistrate. In North Dakota a search warrant may be
issued only when property has been stolen or embezzled,
has been used to commit a felony, or is in the possession
of any person with the intent to use it for the purpose of
committing a public offense.7 A search warrant may be
issued under federal laws when property has been stolen,
or embezzled, or has been used, as the means of committing
a crime, or is possessed, controlled or designed or intended
for use, or has been used in the violation of law in aid of
any foreign government. 9
A search made either with a search warrant or as an
incident to a lawful arrest is not reasonable when it is
made for merely evidentiary material. In order to be
through the window is not a search. In the People v. Exum, 47 N.E.2d 56
(Ill. 1943) where the officer observed items in full view and plainly dis-
cernible upon the back seat of an automobile, in the ray of his flash-
light, the court said: "It is not a search to observe that which is open and
patent in either sunlight or artificial light."
1. Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1920).
6. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-01 (1961).
7. "Grounds for issuance of search warrant. A search warrant may
be issued upon any of the following grounds:
1. When property is stolen or embezzled, it may be taken on
a search warrant from any house or place in which it is concealed,
or from the possession of the persons by whom it was stolen or
embezzled, or of any other person in whose possession it may be;
"2. When it was used as the means of committing a felony,
it may be taken on the warrant from any house or other place in
which it is concealed, or from the possession of the person by
whom it was used in the commission of the offense, or of any
other person in whose possession it may be;
"3. When it is in the possession of any person with the intent
to use it as the means of committing a public offense, or in the
possession of another to whom he may have delivered it for the
purpose of concealing it or preventing its being discovered it may
be taken on the warrant from such person, or from a house or
other place occupied by him or under his control, or from the
possession of the person to whom he may have delivered it."
N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-02 (1961).
8. Rule 41(b) of the Fed. R. Crim. P.
9. "Grounds for Issuance. A warrant may be issued under this rule
to search for and seize any property.
"1. Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United
States; or
2. Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used
as the means of committing a criminal offense; or
3. Possessed, controlled, or designed or intended for use or
which is or has been used in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., § 957."
Rule 41(b) of the Fed. R. Crim. P.
"Whoever, in aid of any foreign government, knowingly and
willfully possesses or controls any property or papers used or de-
signed, intended for use in violating any penal statute, or any
of the rights or obligations of the United States under any treaty
or the law of nations, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im-
prisoned not more than ten years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 957.
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reasonable a search must be for instruments of a crime,
weapons by which escape may be effected, or contraband."0
An application for a search warrant must be made to
a magistrate by a sworn complaint setting forth the grounds
for the issuance of the search warrant and describing with
particularity the person or the place to be searched and
the personal property to be seized.1
A search warrant will not be issued unless the magistrate
is satisfied, after the examination under oath of the com-
plainant and of such witnesses as he may have produced,
that there is probable cause to believe that grounds exist
for the issuance of the warrant. 1 2 This is only another way
of saying that there must be probable cause to believe that
a crime has been or is about to be committed and that a
search will disclose fruits or instrumentalities of crime.1
3
Probable cause has been defined as facts sufficient to justify
10. In Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145, 154, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 1103 (1947) the
court said: "This court has frequently recognized the distinction be-
tween merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be
seized either under the authority of a search warrant or during the
course of a search incident to arrest, and on the other hand, those ob-
jects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and
means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen
property, weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be af-
fected, and property the possession of which is a crime." See also Williams
v. U.S., 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959), and U.S. v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp., 171
(D.C.N.Y. 1954).
11. "A search warrant can be issued only upon probable cause supported
by affidavit naming or describing the person, and particularly describing
the property and place to be searched." N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-03 (1961).
"A warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to before the judge or
commissioner and establishing the grounds for Issuing the warrant. If
the judge or commissioner is satisfied that grounds for the application
exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall
issue a warrant identifying the property and naming or describing the
person or place to be searched. The warrant shall be directed to a civil
officer of the United States authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing
and law therof or to a person so authorized by the President of the United
States. It shall state the grounds or probable cause for its Issuance and the
names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken in support thereof.
It shall command the officer to search forthwith the person or place
named for the property specified. The warrant shall direct that it be
served in the daytime, but if the affidavits are positive that the property
is on the person or in the place to be searched, the warrant may direct
that it be served at any time. It shall designate the district judge or the
commissioner to whom it shall be returned." Rule 41(c) of the Fed. R.
Crim. P.
12. "The Magistrate, before issuing a search warrant, must examine
on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, and must
take their affidavits in writing and cause them to be subscribed by the
parties making them. The depositions must set forth the facts tending
to establish the grounds of the application or probable cause for be-
lieving that they exist." N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-04 (1961).
"If a magistrate is satisfied of the existence of grounds of the ap-
plication for a search warrant, or that there is probable cause to believe
their existence, he must issue a search warrant, signed by him, with the
name of his office, to a peace officer in his county, commanding him
forthwith to search the person or place named for the property specified.
and to bring it before the magistrate to be dealt with according to law."
N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-05 (1961).
13. Note in 32 Ind. L. Rev. 332 at 345.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
a prudent and cautious man in believing that an offense
has been committed, which is less than certainty of proof,
but more than- a suspicion or a possibility; 14 or which are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been committed
or is being committed. 0 An affidavit in support of an ap-
plication for the issuance of a search warrant, which merely
sets forth the affiant's belief that there is reason to search,
but does not disclose the facts and circumstances does not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause.", However, such
an affidavit has been held to be sufficient although the facts
stated therein are based upon hearsay,' where there is a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay evidence. 18 The
magistrate will issue the warrant when he is convinced that
there is probable cause to believe that grounds exist for
the issuance of it.19 In North Dakota a person who malic-
iously and without probable cause procures the issuance of
a search warrant shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.2 0
If there has been a positive representation under oath
that the property is on the person or in the place to be
searched the warrant will direct that it be served at any
time of the day or night, but in absence of such a representa-
tion, the search warrant can be served only during the day-
time in North Dakota. 21  An officer directed to serve a
search warrant may break open an outer or inner door or
window of a house to serve such a warrant, where he is
refused admittance after he has given notice of his authority
and his purpose. 22  A peace officer who wilfully exceeds
14. In Dean v. State, 107 A.2d 88 (Md. 1954), where the question arose
as to probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant the court said
on page 92 of its opinion: "Probable cause is to be determined by the
judge who issues the warrant, and the facts relied upon to show its exist-
ence are sufficient if they are such as to justify a prudent and cautious
man in believing that the offense has been committed. Fleming v. State.
201 Md. 145, 149, 92 A.2d 747, 749; Smith v. State, 191 Md. 329, 62 *A.2d
287, 5 A.L.R.2d 386; Lucich v. State 194 Md. 511, 71 A.2d 432. As was said
in those cases, probable cause is less than certainty of a proof but more
than suspicion or possibility."
15. Draper v. U.S. 358 U.S. 307, 312, 79 Sup. Ct. 329, 333 (1959); U.S. v.
Nicholson, 303 F.2d 330 (C.A. Tenn. 1962); Evans v. U.S. 242 F.2d 534, 536
(C.A. Tenn. 1957), Cert. Denied 352 U.S. 976, 77 Sup. Ct. 1059 (1957).
16. Nathanson v. U.S., 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 Sup. Ct. 11, 13 (1933).
17. Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257. 271, 80 Sup. Ct. 725, 736 (1960); and U.S.
v. Eisner, 297 F.2d, 595, 596 (1962).
18. Chin Kay v. U.S., 311 F.2d 317, 320 (1962); U.S. v. Eisner, 297 F.2d
595, 596 (1962).
19. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-05 (1961).
20. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-18 (1961).
21. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-10 (1961).
22. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-08 (1961).
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his authority in the execution of a search warrant or
exercizes it with unnecessary severity is guilty of a mis-
demeanor under the North Dakota Code.2 3  After the officer
has executed the warrant by having made the search directed
to be made he is required by the North Dakota Code to
return the warrant to the magistrate who issued it, together
with a written inventory of the property taken 24 and the
magistrate, if requested, must deliver a copy of the inven-
tory to the person from whose possession the property was
taken and he must also deliver a copy of such inventory to
the person who made application for the warrant. 25 A search
warrant becomes void under the North Dakota Code if it is
not executed within ten days after it has been issued.
2 6
A search warrant is not required for the search of open
fields, 27 or of a public place.
28
SEARCH INCIDENT To A LAWFUL ARREST
A search which is an incident to a lawful arrest is
reasonable and is therefore not prohibited by the Federal
and North Dakota Constitutions. 29 The purposes making
such a search reasonable are: the protection of the officer,30
the prevention of escape 31 and the preservation of the fruits
or instrumentality of the crime.2
An arrest is defined by the North Dakota Code as
the taking of a person into custody in the manner
authorized by law to answer for the commission of an
offense. ' 3 3 According to the North Dakota Code "An arrest
23. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-19 (1961).
24. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-12 (1961).
25. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-13 (1961).
26. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-11 (1961).
27. Hester v. U.S., 265 U.S. 57, 44 Sup. Ct. 445 (1924); Giacona v. U.S.,
257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1958); Edwards v. U.S., 206 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1953);
Martin v. U.S. 155 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1946).
28. Ellison v. U.S., 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir., 1953) where officers who
were waiting on defendants porch after having rung his doorbell, saw
stolen goods.
29. Agnello v. U.S. 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 5 (1925); Harris v. U.S.
331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947); People v. Edge, 94 N.E.2d 359 (Ill.
1950); and People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583 (N.Y. 1923).
30. "An officer has authority, incidental to a lawful arrest, to search
the prisoner after his arrest. The justification is the officer's safety ....
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 26
(1947), Commonwealth v. Lewis, 217 S.W.2d 625 (1949); Brinegar v. State.
262 P.2d 464 (1953); Edwards v. State 319 P.2d 1021 (1957); and Travers
v. U.S., 144 A.2d 889 (D.C. 1958).
31. Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 5 (1925).
32. Agnello v. U.S., 269 20, 30. 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 5 (1925).
33. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-06-01 (1961).
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is made by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant,
or by his submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest.
34
An arrest is valid when it is made either in the execu-
tion of a valid warrant for arrest or without a warrant by
a peace officer or a citizen. The first requirement for the
issuance of a valid arrest warrant is the filing with a
magistrate of a complaint by a person who has reason to
believe that a public offense has been committed by another
person.3 5 Such a complaint is required by the North Dakota
Code to identify the accused, state the county in which the
offense was committed, designate the offense, state the acts
or omissions constituting the offense, describe the person or
property against whom the offense was committed and, if
the offense is against property, give a general description
of the property.3 If the magistrate, after the examination
of the complainant and other witnesses, if any, has reason-
able ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the person against whom the complaint is made
committed it, he will issue a warrant for the arrest of such
person.3 7 The warrant, which is directed to all peace officers
in the State of North Dakota 38 must specify the name of the
accused, state the offense charged, and be signed by the
magistrate who issued the warrant.3 9 The warrant may be
executed in any county in the State of North Dakota by any
peace officer in the state of North Dakota.
40
A peace officer, who may be either a sheriff, a deputy
sheriff, a coroner, a constable, a marshal or a policeman
of a township, city or village,41 can make an arrest in North
Dakota: when a public offense is attempted or committed
in the officer's presence; when a felony has been committed
by the arrestee but not in the officer's presence; when a
felony in fact has been committed, and the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that his arrestee committed it;
when a charge has been made upon reasonable cause, of
34. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-06-09 (1961).
35. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-05-02 (1961).
36. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-05-01 (1961).
37. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-05-06 (1961).
38. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-05-09 (1961).
39. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-05-08 (1961).
40. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-05-09 (1961).
41. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-05-10 (1961).
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the commission of a felony by the arrestee; 42 when there
has been a traffic accident in violation of the Motor Vehicle
Act4" by a nonresident driver, and the police officer, who
is at the scene of the accident has probable cause to believe
that such driver has committed any offense under the pro-
visions of such Act and that he will disregard a written
promise to appear in court; 4 and when a public offense
is committed in the presence of a magistrate and the peace
officer is ordered by the magistrate to arrest the offender. 45
A private person can make a valid arrest in North
Dakota: when a public offense is attempted or committed in
his presence; when his arrestee has committed a felony
but not in his presence; where a felony has been in fact
committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that
his arrestee committed it; 46 and when an offense is commit-
ted in the presence of a magistrate and such private person
is ordered by the magistrate to arrest the offender. 4  The
only difference between a valid arrest without a warrant
by a peace officer and such an arrest by a private person
in North Dakota is that a peace officer may validly arrest
upon probable cause to believe that a felony has been com-
mitted and that his arrestee has committed it although in
fact no felony has been committed and also in the case of
certain violations of the Motor Vehicle Act; whereas a
private person can not arrest upon probable cause to believe
that a felony has been committed unless in fact it has been
committed and a private person has no authority to arrest
in the case of violations of the Motor Vehicle Act by a
nonresident violator unless it constitutes a public offense.
It is virtually impossible to lay down a general definition
of probable cause, which will encompass in all respects
every arrest without a warrant, for the obvious reason that
facts and circumstances vary in particular cases. A satis-
factory definition for general use is found in Dean v. State4 8
where it was held that probable cause is a state of facts
sufficient to justify a prudent and cautious man in believing
42. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-06-15 (1961).
43. Title 39 of the N. D. Cent. Code (1961).
44. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-06-15.1 (1961).
45. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-06-19 (1961).
46. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-06-20 (1961).
47. N. D. Cent. Code § 26-06-19 (1961).
48. 107 A.2d 88 (Md. 1954).
1963]
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that the offense has been committed and that such state
of facts is not required to be such as to establish guilt, but
it must be such as to establish more than a mere suspicion
of guilt. United States Supreme Court decisions in defining
probable cause appear to range from a liberal to a strict
definition of it,4 9 with one case holding that probable cause
can be properly based upon hearsay.5 0 An arrest, either
with or without a warrant, which does not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause is illegal and any search
incident thereto is also unreasonable. Nothing discovered
as the result of such a search can make it a reasonable
search. 51 Probable cause is not required for a search as
an incident to a lawful arrest where probable cause for
such an arrest has been established.5 2 An advantage in the
making of a search as an incident to an arrest under a
warrant is that the matter of probable cause for the arrest
has already been favorably resolved, and the officer is
relieved of the necessity for knowing the facts and circum-
stances constituting probable cause for the arrest. However,
a warrant for an arrest can actually be fatal to the incident-
al search. where the warrant is defective.
5 3
An arrest is not valid where the arrest is a mere
subterfuge for the making of a search, and any search
made after such an arrest is unreasonable because it is not
an incident to a lawful arrest.
5 4
Although a search is usually limited to those things
connected with the offense for which the arrest is made, if
a valid search incident to a lawful arrest discloses an object
which the arrestee can not lawfully possess, such an object
can lawfully be seized for the reason that the possession by
the arrestee constitutes a. crime which is being committed
49. Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 258. 80 Sup. Ct. 725 (1960); Johnson v. U.S..
333 U.S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367 (1948); and Mallory v. U.S., 354 U.S. 449. 77
Sup. Ct. 1356 (1957). An excellent note on the liberal and strict definition
of probable cause by the United States Suvreme Court is found In a
note in 10 Loyola L. Rev. 116 (1959-60).
50. Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725 (1960).
51. Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61, 66 (Fla. 1953).
52. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-man's Land in Criminal Law. 49
Cal. L. Rev. 474, at 493.
53. Kaplan. Search and Seizure: A No-man's Land in Criminal Law, 49
Cal. L. Rev. 474, at 498.
54. State v. Michaels, 374 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1962) which involved an ar-
rest for a traffic violation made solely for the purpose of searching the
vehicle to determine whether it contained contraband property; Collins
v. State 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953). See also U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452.
52 Sup. Ct. 420 (1932).
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in the arrestor's presence and thereby furnishes the authority
for such seizure.
5
There is a time differential in the case of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The search must be made
immediately after the arrest and not before such arrest
under the majority rule, 6 except that contraband which is
Visible to an officer without a trespass, can be lawfully
seized before the arrest because the possession of contraband
is a crime which is being committed in the presence of
the officer. 57 The return to the place of arrest to search
after the arrest is complete constitutes an unreasonable
search 8 for the reason that a search warrant could have
been obtained in the meantime.5 9
A SEARCH AS AN INCIDENT TO ARREST
FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
The search by an officer of a vehicle or a person as
an incident to a lawful arrest for a traffic violation is
reasonable and therefore valid when it is necessary: for the
protection of the officer;60 to prevent the escape of the
arrestee;6 1 or to discover liquor or drugs when the arrest
has been made for driving while under the influence of
liquor or drugs. 2
Upon a lawful arrest for a traffic violation the officer
has the right, as an incident to such an arrest, to search
55. Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947) in which a search
as an incident to a lawful'arrest fon violation of a mail fraud statute dis-
closed draft cards illegally possessed by the arrestee, which were property
received in evidence, over objection in a subsequent prosecution for the
violation of the Selective Service Act.
56. Gatewood v. U.S., 209 F.2d 789 (D.C.C.A. 1953); Commonwealth v.
Lewis 217 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1949).
Courts in the states of California and Washington, which represent
the minority rule, have expressly held that a search may precede an ar-
rest where the officer has a right to make an arrest, but in order for such
a search to be an incident to a lawful arrest the officer must have been
physically able to have made an arrest at the time of such search. People
v. Simon, 290 P.2d 531 (Cal. 1955); and State v. Brooks, 357 P.2d 735 (Wash.
1961).
57. Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947).
58. People v. Kalpak, 140 N.E.2d 726 (Ill. 1957); Rent v. U.S., 209 F.2d
893 (5th Cir. 1954).
59. Shurman v. U.S. 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955).
60. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL
26 (1947); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 217 S.W.2d 625 (1949); Brinegar v.
State, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); Edwards v. State. 319 P.2d 1021 (1957).
61. Brinegar v. State, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); Edwards v. State, 319 P.2d
1021 (1957).
62. Thompson v. State, 121 So. 275 (Miss. 1929); Bennett v. State, 3'4
P.2d 873 (Okla. 1958); Fuqua v. State, 130 S.W.2d 125 (Tenn. 1939)'; Smyrle
v. State, 298 S.W. 598 (Tex. 1927); People v. Johnson, 294 P.2d 189 (Cal.
1956).
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the person of the one arrested and the automobile, including
an unlocked glove compartment, for weapons, if the officer
has reasonable cause to fear for his own safety or to
believe that the one arrested may try to escape. 63  The
search of the locked trunk or the locked glove compartment
of an automobile can not usually be made as an incident
to a valid arrest for a traffic violation unless the arrest
has been for reckless driving, and the officer has reason
to be suspicious of the occupants of the automobile, or the
arrest has been for driving while under the influence of
liquor or of drugs, 64 or the search incident to the arrest for
an ordinary traffic violation has disclosed evidence of the
commission of a felony.6 5 A passenger in the vehicle can
not usually be searched as an incident to the arrest of
the driver of the vehicle for a traffic violation. 66
The seizure of items without a search warrant, in the
case of a traffic violation, is reasonable: where the property
is contraband or it is the fruit or an instrument of another
crime and it is in plain view of the officer; 67 where such
property is disclosed as the result of a search of the
vehicle which is authorized because the vehicle itself is
the instrumentality with which an offense has been commit-
ted; 68 or where such property has come to the attention
of the officer by virtue of the making by him of an inventory
required to be made of the contents of a vehicle impounded
pursuant to law.6 9
Some cases decided in 1959 and 1960 have undertaken
63. See Supra note 62.
64. See Supra note 62.
65. Brinegar v. State, 262 P.2d 464 (Okla. 1953).
66. U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 Sup. Ct. 222 (1948).
67. People v. Carnes, 343 P.2d 626 (Cal. 1959); and Childers v. Com-
monwealth, 286 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. 1955), where the officer shined his flash-
light into the car; Campbell v. U.S., 289 F.2d 775 (D.C.C.A. 1961) where
the driver's having gotten out of his automobile to show the officer his
registration card caused the dome light to illuminate the interior of the
car; State v. Padgett, 289 S.W. 954 (Mo. 1926) where a bottle of whiskey
fell out of the driver's pocket as he was being pulled out of the car by the
officer; State v. Brooks, 357 P.2d 735 (Wash. 1961) where the office]; opens
the door of the car to question the driver of an illegally parked car:
Koscielski v. State, 158 N.E. 902 (Ind. 1927); State v. Christensen. 51 P.2d
835 (Ore. 1935) where the officer looked into a parked car from the high-
way.
68. State v. Randolph, 353 P.2d 238 (Ore. 1960) where the automobile
was being operated by the driver while he was intoxicated.
69. State v. Giles 199 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. 1961) where the automobile had
been left on the highway after the driver had been arrested and taken
to the police station. The Model Traffic Ordinance Revised as of 1956
provides in Section 19-16 for the impounding of vehicles "(1) When any
vehicle is left unattended upon any bridge, viaduct, or causeway, or in
any tube or tunnel where such vehicle constitutes an obstruction to traf-
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arrest for a traffic violation, by requiring the usual grounds
for search - the protection of the officer, the prevention
of escape of the arrestee and the preservation of the fruits
of instrumentality of the crime - to be determined upon
the facts and circumstances of the particular case.70 All
of those cases involved the service of a summons upon the
violator, which is only a notice to appear before a magis-
trate and therefore does not constitute an arrest. 71  For
this reason such cases can be distinguished from the earlier
cases authorizing such a search. 72 Other cases denying the
right to search as an incident to a lawful arrest for a traffic
violation can be distinguished either on the ground that they
involve an unlawful arrest 73 or that the search of the vehicle
was not authorized.
74
A SEARCH OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT A WARRANT
A lawful search can be made by an officer of an
occupied motor vehicle, without a warrant and without its
being an incident to a lawful arrest if the officer has reason-
able cause to believe that the motor vehicle contains contra-
band.75  Such a search is reasonable because there is not
usually sufficient time to obtain a search warrant before
the vehicle is removed.7 6  Although such a search is per-
mitted to prevent the removal or concealment of the contra-
band before a search warrant can be obtained, the vehicle
need not be actually in motion at that time.
77
fic. (2) When a vehicle upon a highway is so disabled as to constitute
an obstruction to traffic and the person or persons in charge of the vehi-
cle are by reason of physical injury incapacitated to such an extent as
to be unable to provide for its custody or removal. (3) When any vehicle
is left unattended upon a street and is so parked illegally as to constitute
a definite hazzard or obstruction to the normal movement of traffic."
70. People v. Watkins, 166 N.E.2d 433 (Ill. 1960); People v. Mayo, 166
N.E.2d 440 (Ill. 1960); People v. Gonzales,, 97 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. 1959);
People v. Zeigler, 100 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1960).
71. Berry v. Bass, 102 So. 76 (La. 1924).
72. People v. Clark, 137 N.E.2d 820 (Ill. 1956) which involved a search
after an arrest for the violation of a municipal parking ordinance; People
v. Berry, 161 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1959) where the search was after an arrest
for the violation of the law providing that vehicles be registered with
the Secretary of State. An excellent discussion of this matter Is found
in Agata, A Reply To Professor Simeone, 7 St. Louis U. Law Rev. 1 (1962).
73. Robertson v. State, 198 S.W.2d 633 (Tenn. 1947).
74. Elliot v. State, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (Tenn. 1938).
75. Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280 (1925).
76. Supra note 75.
77. Scher v. U.S. 305 U.S. 251, 59 Sup. Ct. 174 (1938).
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STOPPING MOTOR VEHICLES FOR INSPECTION PURPOSES
It is not unreasonable to stop a motor vehicle without
a warrant for the purpose of a reasonable investigation of
the vehicle, the driver,", or the driver's license. 9 Such
a stopping of a motorist does not constitute the taking of him
into custody and it is therefore not an arrest.8 0 Accordingly,
such an investigation or search is not justified as an incident
to a lawful arrest, but is instead justified upon the ground
that the operation of a motor vehicle is affected with a
public interest."' Any contraband or evidence of the com-
mission of a crime discovered in the process of such an
investigation is the product of a reasonable search and can
provide probable cause for an arrest by the police officer
without a warrant and, after such an arrest, justify a further
search which is reasonable as an incident to a lawful arrest."
THE RIGHT OF AN OFFICER TO
SEARCH A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN STOPPED
SOLELY FOR QUESTIONING
The general rule is that a police officer may lawfully
stop and detain a person for questioning where the public
interest involved makes it reasonable to do so. s13 The early
common law forbade a search of the person prior to a
lawful arrest for the probable reason that the dangerous
weapons of that time were either a sword, staff or a bow
and arrow and were therefore so clearly visible that a search
of the person was unnecessary for the protection of the
officer. s4 With the advent of easily concealed firearms
which can be fired from under clothing without warning,
the safety of an officer making a lawful investigation could
very well depend upon his right to make a preliminary
search for a dangerous weapon. 5 The Uniform Arrest Act,
Section 3, drafted by the Interstate Commission on Crime,
78. Moore v. State, 306 P.2d 358 (Okla. 1957).
79. State v. Hatfield, 164 S.E. 518 (W. Va. 1932); Commonwealth '.
Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962).
80. PERKINS, THE TENNESSEE LAW OF ARREST 523-24.
81. Miami v. Aronwitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959); Commonwealth V:.
Abell, 122 S.W.2d 757 (Ky. 1939).
82. Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145, 154, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 1103 (1947): and
Brinegar v. State 262 P.2d 464, 479 (Okla. 1953).
83: Gisske v. Sanders, 98 Pac. 43 (1908).
84. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 324 (1942).




permits a peace officer to ". . . search for a dangerous
weapon, any person whom he has stopped or detained to
question . . . whenever he has reasonable ground to believe
that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous
weapon .. ."5.1 Such a search is clearly reasonable when
all of the circumstances involved in the particular investiga-
tion indicate that such a precautionary measure is necessary
for the safety of the officer.
5 .2
OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF REASONABLE SEARCHES
WITHOUT A WARRANT
When a person in an unconscious condition is discovered
by the police, a search of such person is reasonable for
the reason that he might be in need of special medical
care, because of diabetes or an allergy, which would be
disclosed by a card in his possession.
8 5.3
It was held in Frank v. State of Maryland8 6 that an
inspector of the Baltimore City Health Department has the
right, without a search warrant to inspect dwellings for
the purpose of determining the source of a rat infestation.
The Health Code of the City of Baltimore required that
" every dwelling and every part thereof shall be kept
clean and free from and accumulation of dirt, filth, rubbish,
garbage or similar matter, and shall be kept free from
vermin or rodent infestation." The search without a search
warrant was held to be reasonable upon the ground that
the maintenance of community health would be greatly
hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards
necessary for a search for evidence of criminal acts."
About a year later an equally divided United States Supreme
Court in Ohio v. Price"8 affirmed the decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court, which upheld an ordinance authorizing
the same at any reasonable hour, with a penalty provided
for refusal to allow such an inspection.
85.1 Warner, The Uniform Arrest Aet, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344.
85.2 Supra note 60.
85.3 Commonwealth v. Griffith, No. 294,.May 1962 Sess. Erie County Pa..
Q. Sess. June 21, 1962, at 5-6, cited in Mr. Arlen Specter's excellent article
entitled Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems For the Prosecutor, 111 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 4 at 16. The writer of this article does not have access to this
Griffith case.
86. 359 U.S. 360, 79 Sup. Ct. 804 (1959).
87. 359 U.S. 360, 372, 79 Sup. Ct. 804, 811 (1959).
88. 364 U.S. 263, 80 Sup. Ct. 1463 (1960).
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In State v. Cohns9 where the police and firemen inspect-
ed a building after a fire for the purpose of determining
the cause of the fire and to prevent the fire from breaking
out again, it was held that such an inspection constituted
a reasonable search, because such inspection was for the
benefit of the public generally and any evidence discovered
as a result thereof had been lawfully obtained.
Persons and vehicles crossing inter-national boundaries
may be legally searched without a warrant. Such a search
is reasonable because it is required for reasons of national
security and welfare.89 1
The search by a police officer of a truck parked at a
dark intersection at night without lights, with its left wheels
over the paved road, and its windows open, has been held
to be reasonable since such a search was made by the
officer in the performance of his official duty. 0
EXTENT OF THE SEARCH OF THE PERSON
A search of the person is reasonable when it is made
pursuant to a search warrant or is an incident to a lawful
arrest. It is when invasions of the body of the person are
undertaken that the propriety of the search is most frequent-
ly questioned. The California Supreme Court has held that
the taking of a blood sample by medically approved
procedures from a motorist without his consent, for the
purpose of making an alcohol test is a reasonable search
when there is cause to believe that the motorist has violated
the statute which provides that the injury of another when
driving while intoxicated is a felony.' Such a taking of
a blood sample is in effect a search incidental to a lawful
arrest because California is one of the few states which
permits a search prior to an arrest when the officer has
the right and the ability to have made an arrest at the time
of the search. A blood sample taken by approved medical
procedure from an unconscious driver for an alcohol test,
after a traffic violation, but before a lawful arrest for such
89. 347 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1961).
89.1 47 Am. Jur., Search and Seizure § 18.
90. Gaskins v. State, 89 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1956). See also Smith v. State,
290 S.W. 4 (Tenn. 1927).
91. People v. Duroncelay, 312 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1957).
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violation has been held in the States of Delaware, 92 Iowa,
93
Michigan 94 and Wisconsin,9" and by the United States
Supreme Court" not to be a reasonable search.
A lower federal court97 has held that it is a reasonable
search for a doctor to use a rectal probe for the removal
of a fingerstall containing narcotics, when such removal
was preceded by the discovery of a greasy substance
around the anus of the defendant, after an examination of
his person, following a lawful arrest for the illegal possession
of narcotics. Another lower federal court 9s has held that
it is a reasonable search for a physician to use an emetic
to cause a suspected smuggler to disgorge narcotics after
a fluoroscopic examination has disclosed a foreign object
in the abdomen of the suspect, who had presented himself
at a customs inspection station for entry into the United
States.
The Rochim case 99 held that the forced pumping of
the stomach by approved medical procedures, of a person
suspected of having swallowed narcotics, after the police
had first unlawfully broken into his bedroom and had at-
tempted by force to manually remove the container from
the mouth of the suspect, is a violation of due process.
The later Irvine casel° ° has limited the effect of the Rochim
case to situations involving physical violence and brutality.
AREA OF SEARCH
The requirement that the search warrant describe with
particularity the place to be searched, 101 constitutes a limi-
tation upon the area to be searched under a search warrant.
When the search is an incident to a lawful arrest without
a warrant it was held by the United States Supreme Court
in Marron v. U.S. 0 2 that the search was not limited to the
room where the arrest took place, but instead could include
92. Delaware v. Wolf, 164 A.2d 865 (Del. 1960).
93. State v. Weltha, 292 N.W. 148 (Iowa 1940); State v. Tonn, 191 N.W.
530 (Iowa 1923).
94. Lebel v. Swincicki, 93 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. 1958).
95. State v. Kroening, 79 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. 1956).
96. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957).
97. Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (D.C. Cal. 1957).
98. U.S. v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (D.C. Tex. 1957).
99. Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952).
100. Irvine v. People of California, 347 U.S. 128, 74 Sup. Ct. 381 (1954).
101. N. D. Cent. Code § 29-29-03 (1961).
102. 275 U.S. 192, 48 Sup. Ct. 74 (1927).
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all parts of the premises under the control of the arrestee.
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U. S.,111 which was an arrest under
a warrant, established a limitation upon the Marron case by
holding that the search of the premises where the arrest
was made was unreasonable. A year later it was held in
U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 0 4 which was also an arrest under a war-
rant, that the search of the room where the arrest was made
was unreasonable. The only possibility of reconciling the
Go-Bart Importing Co. and the Lefkowitz cases with the
Marron case is upon the ground that there is greater latitude
of search of the place of arrest when the arrest is made for
an offense committed in the presence of the officer, as in
the Marron case, than where the arrest is made upon a
warrant, as was true in the Go-Bart Importing Co. and
Lefkowitz cases. U.S. v. Harris,'0 which was decided about
sixteen years after the Go-Bart Importing Co. and Lefkowitz
cases and was an arrest upon a warrant, enlarged the search
authorized by the Go-Bart Importing Co. and Lefkowitz
cases and represents a return to the broader search of the
Marron case by holding that, where the arrestee is in ex-
clusive possession of a four room apartment, a search which
extends beyond the room in which he was arrested is reason-
able. In United States v. Rabinowit 10 6 decided in 1950, it
was held that the search of a one room office where the
arrest was made under a warrant was reasonable.
Greater liberality of search incident to a lawful arrest
marks the trend in the lower federal courts. Kernick v. U.
S.107 held that a search was reasonable where the defendant
was validly arrested without a warrant in a railroad station
and a search of his person in a police room just off of the
lobby and next to the baggage room produced a baggage
check and a key which resulted in the obtaining and the
opening of a suit case containing heroin. Clifton v. U.S. 0 8
permitted the search of the arrestee's residence although
the arrest had been made, in the yard of the residence. Ac-
cording to U.S. v. Jackson'0 9 the search of the apartment
108. 224 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955).
109. 149 F. Supp. 937 (D.C. D.C. 1957).
103. 282 U.S. 344, 51 Sup. Ct. 153 (1931).
104. 285 U.S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420 (1932).
105. 331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947).
106. 339 U.S. 56, 70 Sup. Ct. 430 (1950).
107. 242 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957).
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of the arrestee a half a block from the place where the
arrest was made was reasonable, because the key used to
open the apartment had been taken from the person of the
arrestee at the time of his arrest. It has been said that if
this trend is carried to its logical conclusion the constitution-
al prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
very likely to become a mere historical curiosity.110
CONSENT
Consent makes a search reasonable because it is in
effect a waiver of the constitutional protection against an
unreasonable search, n1 but submission to authority should
not be mistaken for consent to search,112 and the State there-
fore has the burden of establishing that there has been a
valid consent to the search. 1 3 Obviously, an effective con-
sent to search can be given only by the one whose right of
privacy is involved or by someone who has the authority to
give such consent upon his behalf. In this connection it has
been held that a search made by an officer in reliance upon
apparent authority to give consent to a search makes such
a search reasonable."
4
Since spouses are not agents of the other, in absence of
a special agreement to that effect, neither can give effective
consent to a search of the others property," 5 but if they
occupy the same building as joint tenants, either has the
right to consent to the search of the building, and the evi-
dence discovered as the result of such a search can be
validly used against either of them. 16 However, it has been
held that a husband by virtue of his being head of the house-
hold can give a valid consent to the search of the premises
he occupies with his wife,' 17 and that a wife, who, in the
absence of her husband, controls the premises occupied by
110. Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental To Arrest, 1959 Wash.
U. L. Q., 261, 279.
111. U.S. v. Shules, 65 F.2d 780 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1933).
112. Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (D.C.N.Y. 1946).
113. Channel v. U.S.. 285 F.2d 217 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1960); Judd v. U.S.. 190
F.2d 649 (C.A. D.C. 1951); People v. Georg, 291 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1955).
114. People v. Misquez, 313 P.2d 206 (Cal. 1957); People v. Caritativo.
292 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1956).
115. Simmons v. State, 229 P.2d 615 (Okla. 1951); Kelley v. State, 197
S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1946).
116. People v. Shambley 122 N.E.2d 173 (Ill. 1954).
117. Jones v. State, 177 P.2d 148 (Okla. 1946).
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her and her husband can give a valid consent to the search
of such premises. 18
A landlord can not validly consent to a search of the
tenant's premises 1 9 and the reservation of the right by the
landlord to inspect the leased premises does not enable the
landlord to do so, 20 but the hotel manager can give a valid
consent to the search of a hotel room after the guest has
relinquished the room.121 Persons who have been given the
use and occupancy of a home by the owner thereof can
validly consent to the search of a room in such a home,
which is being occupied by a guest.1
22
Consent by a partner to a search of the partnership
premises is binding upon all of the partners, and evidence
discovered as a result thereof can be used against any of
the partners. 1 23 The official superior of an employee can
not validly consent to the search of the desk of the employee
when the desk was assigned to her exclusive use in the
office where the employee worked,"24 but it has been held
that the superintendent of a six-family house can give a
valid consent to the search of the cellar of the building and
that the consent is binding upon the owner of such building.
25
STANDING
Only the person whose right to privacy has been violated
can object to an unreasonable search."26  One who under-
takes to complain of an unreasonable search must either
own, lease, control, lawfully occupy, rightfully possess, or
have an interest in the premises searched, or in the property
taken. 2 7 It has been held by State Courts that neither
trespassers, 128 nor guests, 129 have standing to object to a
118. People v. Carter, 312 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1957). But Cf. Dalton v. State
105 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. 1952).
119. Chapman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 610, 81 Sup. Ct. 776 (1961).
120. Klee v. U.S., 53 F.2d 58 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1931).
121. Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217, 80 Sup. Ct. 683 (1960).
122. State v. Broadhurst, 190 P.2d 407 (Ore. 1948), Cert. denied 337 U.S.
906 (1949).
123. U.S. v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (C.A. 7th Cir. 1954).
124. U.S. v. Blok, 188 F.2d (C.A. D.C. 1950).
125. Reszutek v. U.S., 147 F.2d 143 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1945).
126. Edwards v. State, 228 P.2d 672 (Okla. 1951); Powell v. Common-
wealth, 282 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1955).
127. Kapler v. State, 71 A.2d 860 (Md. 1950); Powell v. Commonwealth,
282 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1955); State v. Smith, 118 So. 2d 792 (Fla, 1960).
128. Carter v. Commonwealth, 28 S.W.2d 976 (Ky. 1930).
129. Paige v. State, (Tex. 1955); Anderson v. Commonwealth. 229 S.W.2d
756 (Ky. 1950).
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search of the premises occupied by them. In 1960, the
United States Supreme Court held, in Jones v. U.S., 13 0 that
''anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs
may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress,
when its fruits are proposed to be used against him.
''131
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure was
defined by the court as being ". . . a victim of a search and
seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as dis-
tinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the
use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or
seizure directed at someone else. ' ' 1 32 The court also said
"Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,'
'invitee' and 'guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought
not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately
referable to constitutional safeguards.""1 3 A lower federal
court has undertaken to limit the application of the Jones
decision14 to those cases where the accused is charged with
legal possession.
3 5
It has been held by the California courts that any evi-
dence obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees is
inadmissible whether or not it was obtained in violation of
the constitutional rights of the particular defendant."3 6
WIRE TAPPING
The United States Supreme Court held in the Olmstead
case 1 7 that wire tapping is not a search prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. of the Federal Constitution. It was this
Olmstead case which was responsible for the enactment by
Congress of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act"38
which provides in part that ". . . no person, not being author-
ized by the sender shall intercept any communication (by
wire) and divulge ... such intercepted communication to any
person." The Schwartz case139 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1952 held that wire tap evidence obtained
130. 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725.
131. 362 U.S. 257, 267, 80 Sup. Ct., 725, 734 (1960).
132. 362 U.S. 257, 261, 80 Sup. Ct. 725, 731 (1960).
133. 362 U.S. 257, 266, 80 Sup. Ct. 725, 733 (1960).
134. 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725 (1960).
135. Ramirez v. U.S., 294 F.2d 277 (C.A. 1961).
136. People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (Cal. 1955).
137. Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928). See also People
v. Dinan, 183 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1962).
138. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605.
139. Schwartz v. State of Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 73 Sup. Ct. 232 (1952).
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by state law enforcing officers in violation of Section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act 140 is admissible in the state
courts. In 1961 the United States Supreme Court held in the
Pugnach case 141 that a federal court will not enjoin a state
law enforcing officer from presenting in a state criminal
prosecution evidence obtained by wire tapping in violation
of the Federal Communications Act.1
4 2
SEARCH BY A PRIVATE PERSON
It was held by the United States Supreme Court in the
Burdeau case'4 3 that a search by a private person, without
the knowledge or participation by government officials does
not violate the unreasonable search provision of the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution for the reason that
this constitutional provision is a protection against govern-
mental action.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The matter of the admissibility in the federal courts of
evidence obtained by unreasonable search was finally settled
by the Weeks case,'i4 4 which held, in 1914, that such evidence
is not admissible in the federal courts.
While a detailed discussion of the Mapp case 145 is beyond
the scope of this article, mention must necessarily be made
that this Mapp case, by the application of the right of privacy
provision of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of such constitution, prevents, upon constitution-
al grounds, the admissibility in all state courts of evidence
obtained through unreasonable search and seizure by law
enforcing officers.
140. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605.
141. Pugnach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458, 81 Sup. Ct. 650 (1961).
142. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605.
143. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921):
Geniviva v. Bingler, 206 F. Supp. 81 (D.C. Pa. 1961).
144. Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914). See also Boyd
V. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886); and People v. Adams, 192 U.S.
585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904) in connection with the development of the fed-
eral exclusionary rule.
145. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961).
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CONCLUSION
A search is reasonable when it is conducted pursuant
to a valid search warrant or is made as an incident to a
lawful arrest, either with or without a warrant. Some ex-
amples of reasonable searches made without a search
warrant and not as incidents to a lawful arrest, are those
searches made in connection with the investigation of a
motor vehicle, or the driver, or for the purpose of checking
the driver's license; the stopping of a pedestrian for question-
ing; the examination of an unconscious person; the investi-
gation of a dwelling by health, housing, or fire inspectors;
the checking of vehicles and persons crossing international
boundaries; and the investigation of apparently abandoned
vehicles.
